The declaration of war in 1914 was one of the most historic decisions ever made by a British government. Ultimately, it ended a way of governing Britain, and the consequences of this decision continue to influence world affairs to this day.
This page looks at these events through the recollections of those who participated.
During the summer of 1914, the people of Britain enjoyed a prosperous peace. The British Empire was the predominant great power, having enjoyed a century of the so-called ‘Pax Britannica’ (British Peace).
The last major European war involving Britain had been the Crimean war that had ended in in 1856 (and that had largely been geographically confined to Crimea). The last big war, then known as ‘the Great War’, had been that against Napoleon, that had ended at Waterloo in 1815.
In 1906, a Liberal government led by Henry Campbell-Bannerman won an election with a big majority. Campbell-Bannerman used this as a mandate to pass social welfare legislation. Campbell-Bannerman had resigned in 1908 (and would die a few days later). His Chancellor, HH Asquith, replaced him.
Asquith was the last in the tradition of the reforming Victorian Liberal Prime Ministers.
Educated at City of London School and Balliol College Oxford, where he became President of the Union, Asquith became a lawyer and was called to the Bar in 1876. Asquith was a strong speaker, a quality valued in a time when politicians distinguished themselves with strong Commons performances and were required to campaign by speaking at mass meetings.
He was elected MP of East Fife in 1886, becoming Home Secretary in 1892 in Gladstone’s last ministry. He would continue as Home Secretary during Lord Rosebery’s subsequent government.
When the Liberals returned to power in 1906, Asquith became Home Secretary. Upon Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s resignation in 1908, Asquith became Prime Minister.
He set about a programme of significant reform, which provoked a long crisis with the House of Lords. As Prime Minister, Asquith oversaw an era of upheaval, with longstanding issues of Irish Home Rule and women’s suffrage coming to the fore.
Asquith had been married during his early life and had had five children. But his first wife, Helen, died in 1891. He remarried to Margot in 1894, having another five children, though only two survived infancy. Throughout his life he cultivated a close circle of friends. In 1914, he was infatuated with a young woman named Venetia Stanley, to whom he often wrote multiple times a day. Asquith was always known as a drinker and was nicknamed ‘Squiffy’.
The Liberal government had carried out significant reforms, aiming to alleviate poverty. These reforms included:
In 1912, the Liberal government introduced the Third Home Rule Bill. It would provide a Dublin parliament and a level of self-rule for Ireland, within the United Kingdom. However, this proved bitterly divisive. Unionists in Ulster were determined to prevent Home Rule and formed paramilitary militias, with the intention of violent resistance. Irish Nationalists responded by setting up their own forces.
Thousands of rifles were smuggled into Ireland, arming both camps. Within the British army, there was talk of mutiny, rather than forcing Ulster to submit. With the armed camps apparently intractable, the Liberal government spent much of early 1914 attempting to find a solution – with partition discussed.
British world power was upheld by the Royal Navy. But there were new challengers. From the 1890s, Germany began to build up a navy of their own, expanding the number of battleships. In 1905, Britain launched the revolutionary HMS Dreadnought, an all heavy-gun warship, powered by fast steam turbine engines. Germany rapidly began building ‘Dreadnoughts’ of their own. Millions of pounds and reichsmarks were committed to the building programmes. ‘We want eight and we won’t wait!’ chanted Conservative MPs.
In 1904, Britain and France had signed an agreement, settling controversial matters. This was widely seen as an agreement to put aside colonial differences and confront the threat of Germany. This, together with the signing of an agreement with Japan in 1902, effectively ended Britain’s late Victorian policy of ‘splendid isolation’ from international alliances.
The Entente Cordial was buttressed by the Anglo-French Naval Agreement of 1912. This led to a situation where the British fleet protected the North Sea and the French fleet was in the Mediterranean. The agreement somewhat vaguely committed Britain to joint discussions over any third party that ‘threatened the general peace’. A consequence of the agreement was that there were few French warships along the English Channel, because it was expected that the Royal Navy would protect that coastline.
In 1914, the great powers of Europe stood in two power blocs; the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy: and the Triple Entente of Russia, France, and Britain.
John Morley:
‘Grey has more than once congratulated Europe on the existence of two great confederacies, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, as healthily preserving the balance of power. Balance! What a beautiful euphemism for the picture of two giant groups armed to the teeth, each in mortal terror of the other, both of them passing year after year in an incurable fever of jealousy and suspicion!’ (Morley, Memorandum, p.7).
After the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1894, German military commanders had planned for the likelihood of a two-front war. In 1906, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen had created a plan to quickly defeat France, circumventing France’s powerful border fortresses by invading via Belgium. After defeating France, Germany would be free to turn the bulk of their forces towards Russia. Schlieffen himself died in 1913 and his plan was subject to many revisions, but it remained influential. In 1914, German commanders believed that their only chance of gaining the upper hand against France, was by marching through Belgium.
On 28 June 1914, nearly 1,000 miles away, in distant Sarajevo, a city in the Austrian province of Bosnia, the heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife Sophia, was assassinated. His killer, Bosnian Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip fired a handgun that originated in the Serbian state arsenal.
British ambassador in Vienna:
‘… young Serbian student shot them both with a revolver.’ (Quoted in Heffer, p. 5).
Over the weeks that followed, the atmosphere in Europe grew tense. In the Austrian capital, Vienna, the political and military authorities deliberated on a response. In Berlin, Kaiser Wilhelm II was horrified at the murder of his friend, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and promised the Austrians that he would support punitive measures against Serbia. He assumed that Austria would strike quickly, defeating Serbia, and leaving Serbia’s ally Russia unable to act.
However, after nearly a month, nothing had happened. In London, the summer parties continued. High politics was distracted by affairs in Ireland. Few in government gave any thought to affairs on the continent.
On 23 July, Austria issued a diplomatic communication in response to the assassination making demands of Serbia.
The note reached the British Cabinet the following day, towards the end of a meeting dedicated to the situation in Ireland.
Winston Churchill:
‘The discussion had reached its inconclusive end, and the Cabinet was about to separate, when the quiet grave tones of Sir Edward Grey’s voice were heard reading a document which had just been brought to him from the Foreign Office. It was the Austrian note to Serbia …This note was clearly an ultimatum; but it was an ultimatum such as had never been penned in modern times. As the reading proceeded it seemed absolutely impossible that any State in the world could accept it, or that any acceptance, however abject, would satisfy the aggressor. The parishes of Fermanagh and Tyrone faded back into the mists and squalls of Ireland, and a strange light began immediately, but by perceptible gradations, to fall and grow upon the map of Europe.’ (Churchill, World Crisis, p. 110).
The sense of foreboding in London was captured in a letter sent by the prime minister, Herbert Asquith, to his confidante Venetia Stanley. The situation was “about as bad as it can possibly be”, he wrote, and Europe now stood on the brink of “a real Armageddon”. Nevertheless, Asquith felt able to reassure Stanley. “Happily there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more than spectators.” (Asquith, Brock, Letters, pp. 122-3).
On 25 July, Serbia responded to the Austrian note, agreeing to almost all conditions, but refusing Austria in several areas.
Austria, which already had Germany’s support, rejected the response.
Russia, Serbia’s ally, entered a ‘Period Preparatory to War’ on Saturday 25 July.
If Russia became involved against Austria, Germany would defend its ally Austria. France made clear that they would stand by their Russian allies should war break out.
Sir Edward Grey, trying to prevent war, proposed a peace conference to the great powers.
On 26 July, Berlin rebuffed Grey’s peace conference proposal.
Asquith:
‘Cabinet …mainly to talk about war & peace. I am afraid that Grey’s experiment of a Conference a quatre won’t come off, as the Germans refuse to take a hand. The only real hope is that Austria & Russia may come to a deal between themselves. But at this moment things don’t look well, & Winston’s spirits are probably rising.’ (Asquith, Brock, Letters, p. 129).
On 28 July, Austria declared war on Serbia.
On 29 July, the German chancellor met the British ambassador, and sought Britain’s neutrality in any potential European war. He also asked about Britain’s attitude to Belgian neutrality.
Sir Edward Grey (1862-1933), British Foreign Secretary, First World War, 1914. Illustration from The Great War HW Wilson, Vol I, (London, 1914). Credit: Alamy/The Print Collector
Sir Edward Grey was a Liberal stalwart. He had been foreign secretary since 1905. During his time in office, he had helped defuse crises over Morrocco and had achieved an Anglo-Russian entente in 1907. Grey was considered the arbiter of Europe, and he exerted enormous power on behalf of Great Britain.
David Lloyd George by Elliott & Fry, half-plate negative, 1898. Purchased, 1996. Photographs Collection NPG x82168. © National Portrait Gallery, London
David Lloyd George was Chancellor. Lloyd George had passed the People’s Budget in 1909. He was very much seen as a rising star and had been at the forefront of the government’s social welfare reforms. But he had opposed the Boer War over 1899-1902. He was deeply conflicted over the possibility of a European War.
John Morley, 1st Viscount Morley of Blackburn by W. & D. Downey, published by Cassell & Company, Ltd carbon print, published 1890 5 1/2 in. x 3 5/8 in. (140 mm x 93 mm) image size. Photographs Collection NPG x12495. © National Portrait Gallery, London
Lord Morley, John Morley was an old-style Liberal. He had served as a minister in Gladstone’s Cabinet during the 1880s. He was Lord President of the Council. He was also a prominent writer.
John Elliott Burns by E.H. Mills, published by Rotary Photographic Co Ltd bromide postcard print, 1900s. NPG x197725. © National Portrait Gallery, London.
John Burns was a trade unionist and was once a radical. He was aligned with the Liberal Party but stood on the left. He was the first person of working-class origin to enter the British cabinet.
Sir Winston Churchill as a young man, British Prime Minister, 1874-1965. © Alamy/Lebrecht Music & Arts
Winston Churchill had defected from the Conservative Party and joined the Liberal Party in 1904. He had risen the ranks swiftly, becoming Home Secretary in 1910, and First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911. Churchill was a passionate imperialist and was dedicated to upholding the power of the British Empire.
Between 30 July and 4 August, Cabinet met repeatedly, during which time the British decision to go to war was made.
War had now broken out on the continent. Grey’s proposed peace conference was now dead.
Over the days that followed Cabinet discussed a number of issues:
Grey:
‘After the refusal of a Conference one blow to the prospects of peace followed after another. I do not suggest that I thought them the direct consequence of the refusal of a Conference; they were rather like the deliberate, relentless strokes of Fate, determined on human misfortune, as they are represented in Greek tragedy.’ (Grey, Volume 1, p. 314).
Cabinet began to take sides. Grey, Asquith, and Churchill were more hawkish. Morley, Burns, and Simon were against intervention. Lloyd George was sceptical.
John Morley:
‘We could no longer defer decision. Things were moving very rapidly. We could no longer wait on accident, and postpone…We rambled, as even the best Cabinets are apt to do, from the cogent riddle that the European Sphinx or Sphinxes had posed, into incidental points and secondary aspects. I could not, on the instant gather with any certainty in which direction opinion was inclining.’ (Morley, Memorandum, p. 2).
On 30 July, Tsar Nicholas orders the mobilisation of Russian forces.
On 31 July, Asquith wrote.
Asquith:
‘The European situation is at least one degree worse than it was yesterday, and has not been improved by a rather shameless attempt on the part of Germany to buy our neutrality during the war by promises that she will not annexe French territory (except Colonies) or Holland & Belgium.…The City… is in a terrible state of depression and paralysis, is for the time being all against English intervention.’ (Asquith, Brock, Letters, p. 136).
During the early hours of the following morning, Asquith wakens the king during the early hours of the morning to send a message to his cousin, the tsar, in a belated and predictably futile attempt to delay Russian mobilisation.
Asquith:
‘I called a taxi, and, in company with Tyrrell, drove to Buckingham Palace at about 1.30 a.m. The King was hauled out of his bed, and one of my strangest experiences was sitting with him, clad in a dressing-gown, while I read the message and the proposed answer.’ (Asquith, Brock, Letters, p. 140).
Edward Grey:
‘My recollection of those three days, August I, 2, and 3. is of almost continuous Cabinets and of immense strain.’ (Grey, Volume 2, p. 10.).
At this stage of the crisis, the Cabinet was divided. Most did not favour intervention, though Asquith received assurances from Conservative leaders that they would support intervention. Churchill later wrote about the atmosphere of that week.
Churchill:
‘…there was also an invincible refusal on the part of the majority to contemplate British intervention by force of arms should the Foreign Secretary’s efforts fail and a European war begin.’ (Churchill, World Crisis, p. 125).
Asquith summarised the main positions:
Asquith:
‘Lloyd George, all for peace, is more sensible and statesmanlike tor keeping the position still open. Grey declares that if an out and out and uncompromising policy of non-intervention at all costs is adopted he will go. Winston very bellicose and demanding immediate mobilization.’ (Asquith, Brock, Letters, p. 140).
Lloyd George was one of the best-known figures in the country. His resignation would make it very difficult for the government to survive. Churchill would send him note that week appealing to him to support intervention.
Churchill to Lloyd George:
‘It is our whole future – comrades – or opponents.’ (Quoted in Toye, p. 125).
That day, Cabinet refused Churchill’s request to call out Fleet Reserves and complete naval preparations.
Over the course of this, and other Cabinet meetings that week, Cabinet discussed Britain’s obligations to France.
Edward Grey:
‘The real reason for going into the war was that, if we did not stand by France and stand up for Belgium against this aggression, we should be isolated, discredited, and hated; and there would be before us nothing but a miserable and ignoble future.’ (Grey, Volume 2, pp. 15-16.).Churchill:
‘The Foreign Secretary’s second cardinal point was the English Channel. Whatever happened, if war came, we could not allow the German Fleet to come down the Channel and attack French ports.’ (Churchill, World Crisis, p. 116).Asquith:
‘It was against British interest that France shld. be wiped out as a Great Power.’ (Asquith, Brock, Letters, p. 146).John Burns:
‘Why 4 great powers should fight over Serbia no fellow can understand.’ (Quoted in Simmons, p. 25).
Burns stated that a warning against Germany to not attack the French coast was more than he could stand. He argued that it was tantamount to war.
Morley also questioned Britain’s commitments to France. Neither the Entente Cordial, nor the 1912 Naval Agreement, nor any subsequent military or political discussions, obliged Britain to defend France.
Morley:
‘Grey admitted that we were not bound by the same obligation of honour to France as bound France to Russia. He professed to stand by what he had told [French ambassador] Cambon in his letter of 1912, that we were left perfectly free to decide whether we would assist France by armed force. We were not committed, he always said, to action in a contingency that had not yet arisen and might never arise. No immediate aggressive action was entailed upon us, unless there was action against France in the Channel or the North Sea. So much then for the point of honour arising on the French Entente.’ (Morley, Memorandum, p.10).
He also observed that:
John Morley:
‘An entente was evidently something even more dangerous for us than an alliance. An alliance had definite covenants. An entente is vague, rests on point of honour, to be construed by accident and convenience.’ (Morley, Memorandum, p. 17).
Asquith also recorded that on 1 August: ‘The main controversy pivots to Belgium and its neutrality.’ (Asquith, Brock, Letters, p. 140).
Cabinet authorises Grey to tell Germany that a violation of Belgian neutrality might equal war.
That evening, Germany declared war on Russia.
Asquith met Grey and Churchill at Number 10. Churchill informed Asquith that he would mobilise the navy. He returned to the Admiralty to do so. Grey tells Churchill that he’d told the French ambassador ‘that we shall not allow the German fleet to come into the Channel.’ (Churchill, World Crisis, p. 127).
The declaration of war threw light onto the Tsarist autocracy. Morley, for his part, was deeply disturbed by the possibility of intervention alongside such an ally:
John Morley:
‘Have you ever thought, I put to them, what will happen if Russia wins ? If Germany is beaten and Austria is beaten, it is not England and France who will emerge pre-eminent in Europe. It will be Russia. Will that be good for Western civilisation ? I at least don’t think so…Germany is unpopular in England, but Russia is more unpopular still, people will rub their eyes when they realise that Cossacks [soldiers, notorious for their brutality] are their victorious fellow-champions for Freedom, Justice, Equality of man.’ (Morley, Memorandum, p. 6).
Public opinion seemed to have hardened in favour of intervention. Crowds gather in Downing Street.
Asquith:
‘…war is always popular with the London mob. You remember Sir R. Walpole’s remark: ‘Now they are ringing they bells; in a few weeks they’ll be wringing their hands.’ (Asquith, Brock, Letters, p. 148).
The Russian ambassador, Beckendorff, dined with Asquith that night.
Margot Asquith:
‘[We] had a lively altercation. [Beckendorff] said that it was not the Kaiser but his War Party that had prompted the Germans to make this move. I disagreed, as I could not but think that the Kaiser, being the big figure in Germany, was unlikely to be influenced by his son or by any person or Party. I added impulsively that I was glad that we could act together as a nation independent of every other country, which was not very tactful, but I could not help thinking how much I would have disliked any alliance with a country as misgoverned as Russia…’ (Margot Asquith, Volume 2, p. 163).
Asquith met German ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, in the morning.
Asquith:
‘Things are pretty black. Germany is now in active war …We are waiting to know whether they are going to do the same with Belgium. 1 had a visit at breakfast from Lichnowsky, who was very emotionne and implored me not to side with France. He said that Germany, with her army cut in two between France and Russia, was far more likely to be crushed than France. He was very agitated, poor man, and wept. I told him that we had no desire to intervene, and that it rested largely with Germany to make intervention impossible if she would (1) not invade Belgium and (2) not send her fleet into the Channel to attack the unprotected north coast of France. He was bitter about the policy of his Government in not restraining Austria and seemed quite heart-broken.’ (Asquith, Brock, Letters, p. 146).
Cabinet met at 11am until 2pm, and then again at 6.30pm.
Churchill:
‘The Cabinet sat almost continuously throughout the Sunday, and up till lunch time it looked as if the majority would resign.’ (Churchill, World Crisis, p. 128).
They authorise Churchill’s decision to mobilise the fleet.
The Cabinet remained deeply divided.
Asquith:
‘There is a strong party including … reinforced by Ll George, Morley, & Harcourt who are against any kind of intervention in any event. Grey of course will never consent to this, & I shall not separate myself from him. Crewe, McKenna, & Samuel; are a moderating intermediate body. B Law writes that the [Conservative] opposition will back us up in any measures we may take for ‘the support of France & Russia’. I suppose a good number of our own party in the House of Commons are for absolute non-interference. It will be a shocking thing if at such a moment we break up.’ (Asquith, Brock, Letters, p. 146).
Cabinet’s attention turned towards Britain’s obligations to Belgium.
The 1839 Treaty of London was signed on 19 April 1839 by all of the Great Powers of Europe (Austria, France, the German Confederation, Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom). It guaranteed the independence and neutrality of Belgium and required Belgium to be perpetually neutral.
Churchill:
‘If Germany violates Belgian neutrality I want to go to war – if you don’t I must resign.’John Morley:
‘if you do go to war I resign.’ (Quoted in Webb, ‘Political Journal’, p. 49).
Cabinet discussed what the response would be if a part of Belgium was invaded, and the Belgian government chose not to appeal to the guarantors of the 1839 treaty. Grey warned that the British could not be ‘more Belgian than the Belgians’ in respect to the country’s sovereignty.
Edward Grey:
‘The Belgian Treaty was of old date, but it had never dropped out of view. Ever since it was made its existence had been familiar to public opinion, and to each succeeding generation of public men. We had lived in the knowledge of it and in the belief that Britain was bound to defend the neutrality of Belgium… if her neutrality were violated, and the violation submitted to by Belgium and acquiesced in by her guarantors, her independence was gone for ever. She must become the satellite and serf of the great neighbour who had used her as he pleased. It would have been proved that she had a master, and had no friends able or willing to help her.’ (Grey, Volume 2, p. 8).
Morley remained opposed. He told the Cabinet:
Morley:
‘The German line on Belgian neutrality might be met in two ways. One, we might at once make it a casus belli; the other, we might protest with direct energy…and push on by diplomatising. What was the difficulty of the second course? Why, our supposed entanglement with France, and nothing else.’ (Morley, Memorandum, p. 14).
It was also likely discussed whether Britain really was obliged to honour the 1839 treaty at all. In 1914, the Netherlands would choose not to honour its guarantees to Belgium and would remain neutral throughout the war. Soon afterwards, Italy would also renege on its obligations towards the Triple Alliance and would not join Germany and Austria at war (ultimately joining the war on the side of the Entente in 1915).
Cabinet authorised Grey to tell the House of Commons that a substantial violation of Belgium ‘would…compel us to take action’.
Grey told Cabinet that he would resign if Britain did not go to the assistance of France, regardless of a violation of Belgian neutrality.
Asquith wrote in his diary that, in his view, the following six points were clear:
Asquith:
‘(1) We have no obligation of any kind either to France or Russia to give them military or naval help.(2) The dispatch of the Expeditionary Force to help France at this moment is out of the question and would serve no object.
(3) We must not forget the ties created by our long-standing and intimate friendship with France.
(4) It is against British interests that France should be wiped out as a Great Power.
(5) We cannot allow Germany to use the Channel as a hostile base.
(6) We have obligations to Belgium to prevent it being utilized and absorbed by Germany.’
(Asquith, Memories Volume 2, p. 9)
Cabinet also authorised Grey to provide the French ambassador with a qualified assurance of British support. The promise of support proved too much for John Burns who now resigned.
Harcourt:
‘J. Burns sd. he could not agree to Grey’s formula to [French ambassador] Cambon this afternoon as to German fleet attack on Fr. coast and must resign and must resign at once – almost in tears.’ (Quoted in Webb, ‘Political Journal’, p. 49).John Burns:
‘[I have] especial duty to dissociate myself … from such a crime as the contemplated war would be.’“BOARD OF TRADE, “WHITEHALL GARDENS, S.W.
“August 2, 1914.
“DEAR MR. ASQUITH,-The decision of the Cabinet to intervene in an European war is an act with which I profoundly disagree.
“I therefore place in your hands my resignation of my office as President of Board of Trade.
“With deep respect, cordial sympathy and best wishes,-Yours sincerely,
“JOHN BURNS.”
(Quoted in Asquith, Genesis, p. 221).
Morley tells Asquith that he too must resign, but Asquith convinces him to leave it another day.
Morley:
‘[I] felt acutely what Mr Gladstone had often told me, that a public man can have no graver responsibility than quitting the Cabinet on public grounds.’ (Quoted in Morley, Memorandum, p. 16.).Margot Asquith:
‘Conversation at dinner in Downing Street that night was difficult, and whatever topic was started was immediately dropped. When we had finished, Henry went down to the Cabinet room and Sir Edward Grey joined us in the drawing-room. We sat and talked in a disjointed way, all sitting in a circle.’ (Quoted in Morley, Memorandum, p. 16.).
Grey receives assurances from Paris that Belgium won’t be violated, but no answer from Berlin.
Asquith authorises army mobilisation that evening.
A German ultimatum is sent to Belgium in evening. It is received in Brussels at 7pm.
Belgium issues appeals for protection to the countries that signed the Treaty of London in 1839.
Britain telegrams Germany to ask for an assurance that the neutrality of Belgium would not be violated.
Cabinet meets at 11:15am.
Lloyd George:
‘Before then the Cabinet was hopelessly divided — fully one third, if not one half, being opposed to our entry into the War. After the German ultimatum to Belgium the Cabinet was almost unanimous.’ (Lloyd George, War Memoirs, p. 40).Edward Grey:
‘As it became more and more certain that the German Army was going to invade Belgium, the Cabinet began all to face the same way, for we had our backs to the same straight wall.’ (Grey, Volume 2, p. 9).Morley:
‘Asquith, almost at the beginning of his appeal, said with some emphasis that nothing would induce him to separate from Grey.’ (Morley, Memorandum, pp. 26-27).
The German threats against Belgium removed doubts from some waverers. Before the meeting, Lloyd George told Morley that he now supported intervention.
Edward Grey:
‘I remember saying more than once, to colleagues inside or outside the Cabinet, that it did not matter whether the decision was to go to war or to demand conditions from Germany. Conditions meant war just as surely as a declaration of war. Respect for the neutrality of Belgium must be one of the conditions, and this Germany would not respect.’ (Grey, Volume 2, p. 10).Churchill:
‘By Monday the majority of Mr Asquith’s colleagues regarded war as inevitable. Discussion was resumed on Monday morning in a different atmosphere, though it seemed certain that there would be numerous resignations.’ (Churchill, World Crisis, p. 128).
Those still opposed to intervention in the Cabinet were no longer in any position to influence policy. John Morley wrote to Asquith saying that he intended to resign.
Morley:
‘To swear ourselves to France is to bind ourselves to Russia, and to whatever demands may be made by Russia on France. With this cardinal difference, how could I either decently or usefully sit in a cabinet day after day discussing military and diplomatic details in a policy which I think a mistake. Again I say divided counsels are fatal…It is bad enough, but, in my view, war is not the only reply.’ (Morley, Memorandum, pp. 31).
Two other ministers, John Simon and Lord Beauchamp, also resigned but were persuaded to keep their resignations secret until after the declaration of war. They rejoined the cabinet immediately after war was declared.
In Cabinet, Grey received permission for the ‘principal points and general tone’ of his speech to Parliament that afternoon. Grey later wrote that the speech reflected ‘state of mind at which the Cabinet had arrived at the end of our meeting’.
Lloyd George:
‘On Monday afternoon I walked with Mr. Asquith to House of Commons to hear Grey’s famous speech. The crowd was so dense that no car could drive through it, and had it not been for police assistance we could not have walked a yard on our way.’ (Lloyd George, War Memoirs, p. 39).
Parliament was clearly in support of Grey, though some twenty Liberal spoke against the war.
That afternoon, Cabinet met again. Now the way forward was very clear. German forces had invaded Belgium and fighting had begun.
Asquith:
‘We had an interesting Cabinet, as we got the news that the Germans had entered Belgium and had announced that if necessary they, would push their way through by force of arms, this simplifies matters. So we sent the Germans an ultimatum to expire at midnight …’ (Asquith, Brock, Letters, p. 150).
At 2pm, Grey sent a telegram to Berlin demanding respect for the neutrality of Belgium.
“Foreign Office, August, 4, 1914 “We hear that Germany has addressed a Note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich,’
“In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it, and to my telegram of this morning, be received here by 12 o’clock to night [11pm Greenwich Mean Time]. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty’s Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.”
(Headlam-Morley (ed.), British documents, Volume IX, p. 314).
Germany never replied.
There had been a shift in public opinion. Grey’s speech had been well received in the Commons and there was a great deal of outrage and clear public anger at the German invasion.
Margot Asquith:
‘Downing Street was full of anxious and excited people as we motored to the House of Commons the next day: some stared, some cheered, and some lifted their hats in silence.’ (Margot Asquith, Volume 2, p. 192.).
That evening, Asquith waited in the Cabinet Room of Number 10 with Lord President of the Council Lord Crewe, Lloyd George, and Grey.
Edward Grey:
‘That evening some of us sat with the Prime Minister in the Cabinet Room in l0 Downing Street. I was there in touch with the Foreign Office to certify that no ‘satisfactory reply had come from Berlin, though this was, after all that had happened, a foregone conclusion and a matter of form.’ (Grey, Volume 2, p. 18).Lloyd George:
‘As the hour approached a deep and tense solemnity fell on the room. No one spoke. It was like awaiting the signal for the pulling of a lever which would hurl millions to their doom — with just a chance that a reprieve might arrive in time. Our eyes wandered anxiously from the clock to the door, and from the door to the clock, and little was said.“Boom!” The deep notes of Big Ben rang out into the night the first strokes in Britain’s most fateful hour since she arose out of the deep. At the hour, a shuddering silence fell upon the room. strikes Every face was suddenly contracted in a painful intensity.’ (Lloyd George, War Memoirs, p. 47).
Churchill waited at the Admiralty, on the other side of Horse Guards Parade.
Churchill:
‘It was 11 o’clock at night – 12 by German time – when the ultimatum expired. The windows of the Admiralty were thrown wide open in the warm night air… Along the Mall from the direction of the Palace the sound of an immense concourse singing ‘God save the King’ floated in. On this deep wave there broke the chimes of Big Ben; and, as the first stroke of the hour boomed out, a rustle of movement swept across the room.’ (Churchill, World Crisis, p. 136).Margot Asquith: Margot Asquith:
‘How did it how could it have happened? What were we all like five days ago?… I looked at the children asleep after dinner before joining Henry in the Cabinet room. Lord Crewe and Sir Edward Grey were already there and we sat smoking cigarettes in silence; some went out, others came in; nothing was said The clock on the mantelpiece hammered out the hour, and when the last beat of midnight struck it was as silent as dawn. We were at War.I left to go to bed, and, as I was pausing at the foot of the staircase, I saw Winston Churchill with a happy face striding towards the double doors of the Cabinet room.’ (Margot Asquith, Volume 2, pp. 195-6).
Most of those both inside, and outside Downing Street, expected that the war would be relatively short…
Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914. Further declarations of war followed against Austria-Hungary on 12 August and, after another diplomatic failure, the Ottoman Empire on 5 November.
With the British declaration, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India, and large parts of Africa also went to war. This was probably the largest single declaration of war in all of history (a generation later, the Dominion governments would be allowed to make their own decision on whether to join Britain at war).
The British decision turned a European conflict into a global one.
British forces played a critical role in winning the war. The British army grew from a small colonial expeditionary force to a vast industrialised army, 3.8 million strong by the end of the war. They fought major battles at Ypres, Loos, Gallipoli, the Somme, Arras, Passchendaele, and Amiens.
However, the cost was heavy. British and colonial military deaths were nearly 900,000 and 1.6 million wounded. No part of Britain or the British Empire was untouched by the losses of the ‘Great War.’
At the end of the conflict, four of Europe’s great empires had been destroyed. A revolutionary Bolshevik government had emerged in Russia. The United States of America had emerged as a global force for the first time.
British and French forces had carved up the Middle East between them. In the aftermath of the war, this expansion created problems for the future. British rule in India became less stable. Civil war broke out in Ireland.
Britain’s era as the world’s predominant power was over.
Asquith would continue as Prime Minister, but political support began to dwindle. In 1915, he went into coalition with the Conservatives. Then, in 1916, the coalition collapsed, with Asquith replaced by the more dynamic Lloyd George, who would continue as a wartime Prime Minister.
The First World War would see the franchise expanded, to all men over 18 and all women over 30. It would also see the British state take on a much more activist role, with the Cabinet Office created to better coordinate government. Britain’s national debt increased from £650m in 1914 to £7.4 billion in 1919. The nation would be paying the costs of war for decades to come.
After the war, the Liberal Party split and subsequently collapsed. They had won 272 seats in the 1910 election, which fell to 163 in 1918, and then 40 in 1924. There has never been another Liberal prime minister.
Margot Asquith Michael Brock (ed.), Eleanor Brock (ed.), Margot Asquith’s Great War Diary 1914-1916: The View from Downing Street (Oxford, 2014).
Margot Asquith, The Autobiography of Margot Asquith, Volume II (London, 1922).
H.H.Asquith, Michael Brock (ed.), Eleanor Brock (ed.), Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford, 1982).
H.H.Asquith, Memories and Reflections, 1852-1927, Volume 2 (London, 1928).
Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: Volume I (New York, 1923).
David Fromkin, Europe’s Last Summer (London, 2004).
Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916: Volume II (New York, 1925).
Simon Heffer, Staring at God: Britain in the Great War (London, 2019).
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (London, 1933).
Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to War (London, 2013).
John Viscount Morley, Memorandum on Resignation, August 1914 (London, 1928).
Mike Webb, ‘Lewis Harcourt’s Political Journal 1914-16: A New Source for the Liberal Party and the First World War’, Journal of Liberal History, Summer 2015, pp. 46-52.
Richard Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill: Rivals for Greatness (London, 2007).
Alan G.V. Simmonds, Britain and World War One (London, 2012).
H. H. Asquith, The Genesis of War (London, 1923).
J.W. Headlam-Morley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Volume IX (London, 1926).
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