The Fall of Margaret Thatcher

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at the 1985 Conservative Party Conference, Blackpool, England. Credit: BRIAN HARRIS / Alamy Stock Photo

In November 1990, Margaret Thatcher had been Prime Minister for over a decade, winning three elections and reshaping the country in her image.

On 12 November, in a speech at London’s Guildhall, she stated that she was ‘still at the crease’ and determined to go on:

‘There will be no ducking the bouncers, no stonewalling, no playing for time. The bowling’s going to get hit all round the ground. That is my style.’ (Speech at Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 12 November 1990).

Ten days later, she resigned.

What happened?

Margaret Thatcher

Margaret Thatcher was the most important British Prime Minister of the second half of the 20th Century. She reshaped the country in her image and her shadow still falls upon modern politics. Her political style and policy programme became known as ‘Thatcherism’. She was Britain’s first woman Prime Minister and the longest consecutively serving Prime Minister since the 1820s.

She was born Margaret Roberts on 13 October 1925 in Grantham in Lincolnshire. She was the daughter of Alfred Roberts, a shopkeeper and alderman, who was later lord mayor. He impressed upon her values of self-reliance, hard work, and forthrightness that would carry her far.

She studied chemistry at Oxford University, leading the Conservative Association while she was there. During the late 1940s, she worked as a research chemist, reading law in her spare time. From 1954, she practiced as a barrister.

In 1951, she married businessman Denis Thatcher and changed her surname to his. She ran for Parliament in 1950 but failed to win the seat. In 1959, she won the safe Conservative seat of Finchley.

She became Shadow Education Secretary in 1967 and went on to be Education Secretary during Heath’s 1970-74 government. She was associated with a decision to scrap a program that provided free milk to schoolchildren, leading to the nickname ‘Milk Snatcher’, though it was later revealed that her hand was effectively forced by the Treasury. She later wrote that it had been a ‘valuable lesson’ in withstanding political pressure.

When Conservative leader Edward Heath was defeated in the October 1974 election, he called a leadership election for February 1975 to reassert his authority. But Thatcher unexpectedly won the leadership contest.

In 1979, after a period of strikes nicknamed the ‘Winter of Discontent’, Thatcher put down a motion of no confidence in the government. The government lost by one vote. Thatcher won the subsequent election with a 44-seat majority.

During Thatcher’s first ministry, her focus was very much on economic policy, with spending cuts and monetarism. Despite the indicators being bad, she continued her policies with the landmark 1981 budget. That year saw rioting in English cities. In 1982, Britain defeated Argentina in the Falklands War. Thatcher was re-elected in 1983 in a landslide.

In 1984, the IRA attempted to assassinate her with a bomb at the Brighton Grand Hotel during the Conservative Party conference. Five people were killed and 31 injured. But Thatcher was unharmed, and gave her conference speech the next day as scheduled.

During her second ministry, Thatcher focused on breaking the power of the trade unions including during the Miners’ Strike of 1984-85. With the unions tamed, she made Britain safe for neoliberal capitalism and London grew to be the world’s financial centre. She formed a strong political relationship with US President Ronald Reagan.

There was a third election victory in 1987.

**Image credit**: Margaret Thatcher, probably Terence Donovan, 14 January 2005. Margaret Thatcher Foundation (Accession number 215289)

Thatcherism: Britain in the 1980s

Economic Policy

During her first term, Thatcher focused on economic issues. Her first chancellor was Geoffrey Howe, and he would be tasked with delivering her signature policy of ‘monetarism’, whereby the monetary supply was reduced in order to battle inflation. Howe’s budgets in 1979, 1980, and 1981, cut income tax, raised indirect taxes, and cut public expenditure (including industrial subsidies). However, the promised economic recovery failed to materialise, with unemployment and inflation rising.

By 1983, the economy began to show signs of recovery. Inflation fell from 18% to 8% and growth began to increase, though unemployment remained high. In the election of 1983, the Conservatives won a landslide victory, with her majority rising from 44 to 144.

With a huge majority, Thatcher now set her sights on Britain’s powerful trade unions. Uncompetitive industries were privatised, with many simply going under. In 1984, The National Union of Miners launched the biggest and most dramatic of the strikes, which lasted for an entire year and saw scenes of violence between police and the strikers. Thatcher prevailed and the strike collapsed in 1985, with most of the mines subsequently closed. Anti-trade union laws followed, with union membership halving between 1979 and 1997. Entire regions of the country were left deprived by the collapse of once mighty industries.

Miners’ Strike 1984 - 1985. Police and Pickets clash. — Miners’ Strike 1984 – 1985 Pictured. Police and Pickets clash Orgreave coking plant near Sheffield Yorkshire Friday 1st June 1984. Credit: Trinity Mirror / Mirrorpix / Alamy Stock Photo

During her second ministry, Thatcher was free to implement her more distinctive economic policies. The great state industries and companies, many nationalised by Attlee’s Labour government, were privatised. Council houses were sold to tenants. A new, financial services-based economy was encouraged by various measures that were dubbed ‘the Big Bang’ in 1986. London became one of the world’s most important financial centres.

By the end of the 1980s, Britain demonstrated some of the strongest economic growth in the world, with burgeoning ‘white collar’ financial and service sectors. By 1990, the British economy was far healthier than it had been in 1979, and Britain had shaken off its reputation as ‘the sick man of Europe’. But the country was also far more deeply divided, with a far greater gap between the wealthy and the poor.

Equity share dealing desk at warburgs Merchant bank in the City of London in the 1980s. Credit: Barry Lewis / Alamy Stock Photo

Foreign Policy

Internationally, Thatcher formed a close political relationship with US President Ronald Reagan. They shared the same market-oriented economic outlook (though Reagan’s policies were, in practice, rather more conservative), belief in western ideals, and dislike of Soviet Communism. Under their leadership, the Cold War of the early 1980s would become colder still (though, admittedly, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had ended the 1970s era of détente).

But, despite her ‘Cold Warrior’ credentials, which saw her branded as the ‘Iron Lady’ by one Soviet publication, Thatcher was one of the first to recognise a reformer in the shape of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and said ‘we can do business together’. During the late 1980s, as the Soviet Union was ever more troubled by economic concerns, the Cold War began to thaw. (TV Interview for BBC, 17 December 1984).

Elsewhere, Thatcher’s approach tended to be guided by Cold War thinking. She was suspicious of the African National Congress’s fight against Apartheid South Africa and was uncomfortable with efforts to weaken the regime, which she thought would open the doors to communism. Meanwhile, she was supportive of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile (though, at arms-length during her premiership at least).

In Europe, Thatcher had supported the ‘Yes’ campaign in the 1975 referendum on continued membership and had worked with the European Community to create the Single Market. But, by the end of the 1980s, she had clashed many times with the Commission President Jacques Delors and was critical of those who supported a more federal Europe. In her 1988 Bruges speech, she said that ‘willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community’.

5/2/1985 President greeting Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for a bilateral meeting at Schloss Gymnich in Bonn Federal Republic of Germany. Unknown photographer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Falklands War, 1982

In April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falklands Islands, a small British colony in the South Atlantic. Argentina’s military leaders had assumed that the British would leave them alone. Indeed, Thatcher herself had cut the last navy ship that had protected the islands. Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington took responsibility and resigned.

Thatcher responded to the invasion with clarity and determination, swiftly ordering a task force to recapture the islands. She ordered the Argentinian cruiser, ARA General Belgrano, which was outside the British-declared ‘exclusion zone’, sunk by a Royal Navy submarine. Over the days that followed, several British ships were destroyed by Argentinian missiles, and casualties mounted. But, once the majority of the army was ashore, they quickly defeated the Argentinian forces. On 14 June, the Argentinian military commanders surrendered their forces and the Falklands were British again.

Just over 900 people were killed during the fighting and thousands more wounded. The financial cost was enormous. However, the war was a clear British victory, an act of international aggression had been defeated, and it energised Thatcher’s government, helping her win the 1983 election.

1987-90: Shaking Foundations

Thatcher speech, September 1990:
When I look for encouragement in difficult days…my role models are not long-serving Prime Ministers like Lord Liverpool, William Pitt or Sir Robert Walpole, but escape artists like Houdini. After all if you can’t win an election wrapped in chains, locked in a box and thrown into the river, you shouldn’t be in politics. (‘Speech to Variety Clubs Dinner’, 13 September 1990).

In June 1987, Thatcher’s Conservatives won a third general election victory in a row. There had been jitters on the campaign, but ultimately it was an impressive victory, with the Tories winning 376 seats and a majority of 102.

But, from 1987 onwards, events would increasingly conspire to create a sense that it was a time for a change in Number 10…

The poll tax and growing unpopularity

Over 1987-88, Thatcher reformed the local government taxation rates system, replacing it with a new form of flat taxation that was officially called the Community Charge, but which soon became known, even to government ministers, as the ‘poll tax’.

The tax was seen by many as unfair. A fixed rate fell more heavily on the less well-off, and benefited the pockets of the rich. Initially, the poll tax was introduced in Scotland from 1989, creating great bitterness. The following year, it was introduced in England as well.

As the full ramifications of the ‘poll tax’ emerged over 1989-90, there were protests across the country, including in the Thatcherite strongholds in the Tory Shires. In London, over 100,000 demonstrated and there the protest turned violent with clashes between protestors and the police in Trafalgar Square. By the beginning of 1990, the Labour lead in the opinion poll was regularly in double digits. For the first time, Thatcher lost the support of her key constituencies and became unpopular.

By mid-1990, most political commentators anticipated a Labour victory at the next general election, which would most likely be in 1992.

The end of the Cold War

In January 1989, Ronald Reagan’s second term as President ended. He and Thatcher had been close political allies. He was replaced by his fellow Republican and former Vice President, George H.W. Bush. But, in contrast to his predecessor, Bush talked of a ‘kinder, gentler Conservatism’ and, he was, temperamentally, quite different to Margaret Thatcher – more reserved, contemplative, and less strident. He found Thatcher bossy and was less inclined to listen to her ‘lectures’. The relationship was more awkward and less close. (Moore, Herself Alone, p. 494).

Thatcher and Bush - 1990. — Thatcher and Bush – 1990. This photo was taken by the Presidential photographer., Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

In late 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War came to an end. Stripped of Soviet hard power, the Eastern European puppet regimes collapsed. Amongst them, the Communist German Democratic Republic (or ‘East Germany’). The German public increasingly demanded the ending of the country’s post-Second World War division and the ‘reunification’ of the East with the Federal Republic of Germany (or ‘West Germany’).

Now, Thatcher threw her efforts into preventing a reunification of Germany. She feared that the creation of a powerful Germany would destabilise Europe, just as it had, in her view, between 1871 and 1945.

Bush did not agree. He was carefully diplomatic but was adamantly against Thatcher’s campaign. Eventually Bush publicly stated his support for a united Germany, and by January 1990 Thatcher had accepted that it was inevitable. (‘The Fall of the Berlin Wall’, Miller Center & Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 792-8).

In August 1990, Iraq invaded its neighbour Kuwait. A multinational coalition, led by the United States formed with the intention of expelling Iraq from Kuwait. Thatcher committed Britain to the conflict, and would spend much time over the August-November 1990 dealing with the build up to the conflict.

Two Marine Corps battle tanks move across the desert during Operation Desert Storm — Two Marine Corps M-1A1 Abrams main battle tanks move across the desert during the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm National Archives at College Park – Still Pictures, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

‘Sack Walters, or I resign’

In the Treasury, Chancellor Nigel Lawson had collaborated closely with Thatcher since he was appointed in 1983. They had worked together on her free market programme which had led to the ‘Lawson Boom’ of the mid-1980s.

But by 1989, he bristled at Thatcher’s manner. They began to disagree on economic policy. By the late 1980s, inflation had returned and the economy was no longer performing as well as it had during the boom years of the mid-80s.

Lawson wanted to bring Britain into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) – for purposes of stability and fiscal discipline. But Thatcher opposed. He settled upon a strategy of ‘shadowing the Deutschmark’ instead to ensure interest rate stability. Thatcher was furious when she discovered this. Shortly afterwards, before the EU summit in Madrid, he and Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe threatened to resign if Thatcher did not name a date for ERM entry. She backed down and appeased them (Britain ultimately did enter the ERM in October 1990). But the rift at the top of government grew wider. (Moore, Herself Alone, pp. 99-100, 318-9).

Lawson resented the fact that Thatcher took economic advice from her Number 10 adviser, the economist Alan Walters. This advice often went against his own advice, as Chancellor. In October 1989, Lawson decided that enough was enough, telling Thatcher directly ‘Sack Walters, or I resign’.

Lawson spoke to Thatcher that day, but the differences were irreconcilable. On 26 October 1989, he resigned (as too did Walters). (‘Nigel Lawson’s resignation’, Thatcher Foundation).

Nigel Lawson 1986 as Chancellor. Credit: BRIAN HARRIS / Alamy Stock Photo

1989 Ten years

In 1987, several commentators noted that Thatcher was now the first Prime Minister since Lord Liverpool (1812-27) to have won three general elections on a row. ‘I hope to go on and on’ she had told the BBC in May that year. (‘TV interview for BBC’, 11 May 1987).

In May 1989, Thatcher celebrated her tenth year in power. With Thatcher’s longevity came questions about the future, and when she would leave power. In late 1988, her husband, Denis Thatcher had suggested that she think about life after the premiership. In the summer of 1990, Lord Carrington, the influential Tory grandee, had hosted Thatcher at his Bledlow home in Buckinghamshire, and asked her directly when she planned to step down. But she had said nothing. (Moore, Herself Alone, p. 578).

Publicly, Thatcher brushed off questions about departure or succession. In early 1990, an interviewer said that if she continued to the next election she might well pass Lord Liverpool’s record of nearly 14 years in power. She replied ‘That is quite a target! A nice target to beat!’ In another interview, she even alluded to the possibility ‘we might even break Walpole’s record’. Walpole had been Prime Minister for almost 21 years. (‘Interview for Dundee Courier’, September 1989 & ‘Interview for Sunday Telegraph, 23 March 1990).

However, within the Conservative Party, MPs and ministers wondered about who would follow her. Many felt that a change of style, away from Thatcher’s more strident and divisive approach, would be welcome. Nor was the speculation merely political; the drama House of Cards first aired in November 1990, and began with the main character, the unscrupulous Francis Urquhart, looking at a photo of Thatcher and then shutting it away in a drawer. (‘Chapter One’, House of Cards).

By the end of the 1980s, the questions of Thatcher’s political mortality, and of who would follow her, were being asked more and more.

‘The Stalking Horse challenge’

Conservative Party rules stated that the leader needed to be re-elected by MPs every year. Since wresting the leadership from Edward Heath in 1975, Thatcher had been unopposed.

On 22 November 1989, Conservative MP Sir Anthony Meyer announced that he would challenge Thatcher for the leadership of the Conservative Party. An eccentric backbencher, Meyer had been critical of Thatcher’s increasingly fractious relationship with the European Community and of the Poll Tax.

Meyer was a ‘stalking horse’ candidate. The term comes from an old hunting device, whereby the hunter would conceal themselves behind a horse shaped screen and use it as a camouflage to pick off targets. In the metaphor, the ‘stalking horse’ candidate is concealment for the true hunters who will emerge later. Nobody thought that there was a realistic prospect of Meyer becoming Prime Minister. However, if he attracted enough votes to force a second ballot, he would have withdrawn from the contest, allowing more credible candidates to commit themselves.

But, Thatcher’s campaign was well organised. When the ballots were counted on 5 December 1989, Thatcher won 314 votes, with 33 going to Meyer, and 27 spoilt papers. Many around Thatcher started to wonder if this was the beginning of the end. Thatcher, for her part, considered the matter closed. (Moore, Herself Alone, pp. 355-354).

Thatcher and Europe: ‘No, No, No’

As time passed, Thatcher became far more combative towards the European Community. When she had started as Prime Minister, she had demanded a rebate of British funding, which she had received from 1985. From 1987, she grew suspicious of increasing federalism in Brussels, and gave the Bruges speech in 1988 opposing any concept of a federal Europe.

However, preparations for a new European treaty continued. With Germany uniting, and likely becoming a powerful political force again, many believed the right approach was to bind the new country into the European apparatus. Thatcher disagreed.

By mid-1990, her suspicions had grown. But many of her Cabinet colleagues, and many in the Conservative Party did not agree; they were still fairly pro-Europe and did not want to alienate Brussels. They remembered the long struggle to get Britain into Europe during the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, they had worked with the European Community to create the Single Market, the creation of which was a considerable achievement.

In October, at the Rome Summit, Thatcher rejected any British membership of future economic and monetary union, which went against her Cabinet’s agreed position. On 30 October 1990, she spoke in the House of Commons, rejecting any further European integration.

Margaret Thatcher:
Yes, the Commission wants to increase its powers. Yes, it is a non-elected body and I do not want the Commission to increase its powers at the expense of the House, so of course we differ. The President of the Commission, Mr. Delors, said at a press conference the other day that he wanted the European Parliament to be the democratic body of the Community, he wanted the Commission to be the Executive and he wanted the Council of Ministers to be the Senate. No. No. No. (HC Deb 30 October 1990, vol 178, cc873).

Flag of Europe

November 1990

Geoffrey Howe

Geoffrey Howe had been Chancellor and Foreign Secretary, serving as a Cabinet minister throughout Thatcher’s premiership, and was one of her closest political allies.

Thatcher had removed him from the Foreign Office in 1989, making him Deputy Prime Minister. But he felt that his advice and experience were increasingly ignored, and little respect was afforded to his new position. He disagreed with her on the Poll Tax and on her growing scepticism towards the European Union. Relations between the two were now very tense. (Howe, Conflict, p. 632).

On 1 November, two days after Thatcher’s ‘No. No. No.’ statement to the House, Howe resigned.

Over the days that followed, there was a growing sense of unease in Number 10. Thatcher realised that a leadership challenge was possible. However, she was distracted by the Gulf War, preparations for a diplomatic summit in Paris, and by various other events, including the State Opening of Parliament and the debate on the address on 7 November. Having seen off Meyer’s challenge the previous year, she felt confident about her ability to see off threats.

On Monday 12 November, Thatcher spoke at the Guildhall in London, saying that she was ‘still at the crease’. (Speech at Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 12 November 1990).

On Tuesday 13 November, Howe made a resignation speech in the House of Commons after PMQs.

He turned on Thatcher’s European policy. He warned about a ‘retreat into a ghetto of sentimentality about our past and so diminish our own control over our own destiny in the future’.

“I believe that both the Chancellor and the Governor are cricketing enthusiasts, so I hope that there is no monopoly of cricketing metaphors. It is rather like sending your opening batsmen to the crease only for them to find, the moment the first balls are bowled, that their bats have been broken before the game by the team captain.

…The tragedy is – and it is for me personally, for my Party, for our whole people and for my Right Honourable Friend herself, a very real tragedy – that the Prime Minister’s perceived attitude towards Europe is running increasingly serious risks for the future of our nation.” (HC Deb 13 November 1990, vol 180, cc461-5).

There were gasps in the chamber and an intake of breath. Howe finished:

“The time has come for others to consider their own response to the tragic conflict of loyalties with which I have myself wrestled for perhaps too long.” (HC Deb 13 November 1990, vol 180, cc461-5).

Thatcher looked on horrified. By the time he sat down, most Conservatives realised that Howe had fired the starting pistol for a leadership contest.

Leadership Challenge

On the morning of Wednesday 14 November 1990, Thatcher’s media digest stated that there was ‘Confidence that Heseltine will announce his candidacy today’ and that ‘You are fighting for your political life as Howe urges MPs to mutiny’.

Sure enough, within a few hours, Michael Heseltine stepped out of his London house and spoke to the media outside:

Michael Heseltine:
“…More than 100 of my parliamentary colleagues have urged me to stand and promised me their support. None of this could I have foreseen, but neither can I ignore the conclusion.

I am persuaded that I would now have a better prospect than Mrs Thatcher of leading the Conservatives to a fourth electoral victory and prevent the ultimate calamity of a Labour government. I have accordingly informed the Chief Whip…that I intend to let my name go forward.” (Heseltine, Life in the Jungle, pp. 362-63).

Conservative Party Chairman Kenneth Baker wrote a memo to Thatcher that day. It contained lots of advice, including that she find a young campaign team and signal a willingness to make changes to her style (including on the Poll Tax):

Kenneth Baker:
“One theme of your leadership campaign should be to forge unity in the Party. The main problem now facing us is that we appear to be divided, bitter and disunited. That is the problem for this week and that will be the problem after this election is over. So your overriding theme should be Party unity, behind your leadership.” (Baker, ‘Party Leadership contest’, 14 November 1990).

The first ballot would take place on the evening of Monday 19 November.

Who was with her and who against? Would the Cabinet stand onside?

21 November

Downing Street, Midday

On the morning of Wednesday 21 November, Thatcher left Paris and returned to London. She arrived at Number 10 at about midday.

She immediately went up to the flat where she saw her husband, Denis. He told her to withdraw: ‘Don’t go on, love’. (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 846).

But she continued to believe that she might yet prevail.

After that, she went to the Downing Street study, meeting with advisers including Norman Tebbit, John Wakeham, and Peter Morrison. During this meeting she suggested departure after the end of the Gulf War, and when inflation was reduced. She said that she preferred the thought of John Major as her successor, because she did not think Douglas Hurd, another likely candidate, would stick with her policies. She was adamantly opposed to a Heseltine-led government. However, though she contemplated departure, she was still set on continuing, winning the leadership ballot, and then selecting a time to leave. (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 847).

At 1315, the group decamped to the Cabinet Room, where they were joined by Kenneth Baker, John MacGregor, Tim Renton (Chief Whip), John Moore, and Cranley Onslow (Chairman of the 1922 Committee).

Baker told the meeting that Thatcher would have to promise to review the Poll Tax and should run with a positive message. Then MacGregor said that he had spoken to most Cabinet ministers and several junior ministers, and whilst few were intending to back Heseltine, most were now doubtful that Thatcher would win the ballot. Amongst those who had doubts were some of her strongest supporters. (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 847-8 & Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990’).

Tim Renton added that the Whips’ Office had also received messages to the effect that many backbenchers wanted Thatcher to withdraw. He said that Thatcher’s support was crumbling amongst MPs, with a real possibility that many would either back Heseltine, or abstain. (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 848 & Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990’).

Cranley Onslow effectively gave a message that the 1922 Committee would be neutral, but added that he thought a Thatcher-led government was preferable to a Heseltine one. He also added that, though Howe and many senior politicians were very concerned about Europe, it was not a big issue amongst the population, and the Poll Tax would matter far more. Likewise, Tebbit also said that while Europe was prominent early on in the campaign, the major issue was the Poll Tax. (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 848 & Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990’).

At the end of the meeting, Thatcher said that she was inclined to fight on, and would make a effort to rally her colleagues. Despite her willingness to continue, she later wrote that the experience of the meeting had been ‘demoralising’. She then left Number 10 for Parliament, where she made a statement on the CSCE meeting.

As she left Number 10, she remarked to the journalists outside: ‘I shall fight on, I shall fight to win’. (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 849).

Parliament, 18:00

At 15:30, Thatcher gave a statement to the House of Commons on the Paris Summit, which lasted for an hour and a quarter. She went to her office in the House of Commons at about 16:45 and then left to attend an audience with the Queen at 17:20. She returned to her Parliamentary office at 18:00. (Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990’).

Now, Thatcher met with members of her Cabinet, individually, to ask them whether she would have their support going forward. For the next two hours she met her Cabinet ministers (and a few junior ministers), speaking to each for about five minutes.

She had prepared her arguments: that she had won three elections, retained the support of the party in the country at large, never lost a vote of confidence in the House, and had won the majority of votes in the previous ballot. However, she found that there would not be much debate. (Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990’).

One after the other, her ministers gave her a very similar message:
“I will support you if you stand, but you cannot win.”

There were variations; Ken Clarke told her that he would personally be happy to support her for 5-10 more years, while others were more direct. Most of the ministers named John Major and Douglas Hurd as the candidates most likely to defeat Heseltine. (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 850-855 & Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990’).

Malcolm Rifkind said that he would have to think about whether to support her candidacy at all if she went forward. Two encouraged her to fight and told her that she could win. Alan Clarke (a junior minister) said that she should fight on and go out in a blaze of glorious defeat. ‘Since I had no particular fondness for Wagnerian endings, this lifted my spirits only briefly’, she later wrote. But, with those exceptions, the message was consistent. (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 850-55).

The meetings concluded at 19:45. It was now clear to Thatcher that her premiership was approaching its end. She dictated a short statement that she might read at Cabinet the next morning. Though, she held off making a final decision, and said that she wished to return to Number 10 and speak to her husband, Denis.

As she left, a group of a dozen supportive MPs arrived. They offered their encouragement and begged her not to resign for about 10 minutes, before Thatcher left at 20:10 to return to Downing Street. (Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990’).

Downing Street, 20:15

Thatcher returned to Downing Street. She immediately went up to the flat for a short conversation with her husband. She later recollected that he offered comfort and reassurance, but it seems that she had now made the decision.

At 20:30, she went down to the Cabinet Room to work on her speech for the confidence vote the next day (Labour had called a confidence vote to capitalise on the Tory agony). She and her advisers planned for how events would be announced over the next 18 hours. Drafting the speech went on for several hours, and even at this late stage, several senior political allies encouraged Thatcher to remain in the contest. (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 856 and Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990).

Even after the Prime Minister left the meeting at 00:45, the little gathering continued to talk for over an hour about ways that Thatcher could still win. One suggested that perhaps they could organise a ‘stalking horse’ candidate of their own, keeping Heseltine’s total low, and forcing a third ballot. It was all denial, or perhaps bargaining. (Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990).

Downing Street, 07:30

At 07:30am on Thursday 22 November 1990, Thatcher phoned her Principal Private Secretary Andrew Turnbull. She told him to go ahead with the plan that they had discussed, confirming to him that she would announce her resignation. Phone calls were made to key figures, including John Major and Douglas Hurd to tell them that the Prime Minister was going to resign that day. (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 856).

At 09:00, Thatcher went to the Cabinet Room. As she walked down the stairs, the normally conversational Cabinet ministers stood silently, and they pushed back against the walls, waiting for her.

When Cabinet began, she read a short statement:

“Having consulted widely among colleagues, I have concluded that the unity of the Party and the prospects of victory in a General Election would be better served if I stood down to enable Cabinet colleagues to enter the ballot for the leadership. I should like to thank all those in Cabinet and outside who have given me such dedicated support.” (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 857-8).

At one point, her voice broke briefly, but she regained her composure. She told the Cabinet that they must be united around the person most likely to defeat Heseltine. (Moore, Herself Alone, p. 708).

After a few short tributes, the meeting ended at 09:15. After that, calls were made to the Speaker of the House and the leaders of the Opposition.

A statement, announcing Thatcher’s resignation, was released to the press at 09:25. (Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990’).

The news flashed around the country, and around the world. Soon, it was being reported by radio and television news. Many people remembered where they were when they heard about Thatcher’s resignation.

Departure

22 November 1990

That morning, Thatcher responded to messages from world leaders and key allies. Then, she went to an audience with the Queen at 13:15 that day. There, she informed her of her decision to resign as Conservative Party leader and, as soon as the Parliamentary party had chosen a successor, as Prime Minister.

Later that day, Thatcher gave a confident and combative performance at Prime Minister’s Questions and during the No Confidence debate. At one point, she exclaimed ‘I am enjoying this.’ (HC Deb 22 November 1990 vol 181 c451).

The motion was rejected by the House by 247–367.

Archival

Margaret Thatcher Foundation

Andrew Turnbull, ‘Prime Minister’s Resignation, 22 November 1990’, 24 November 1990, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, < https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/215542>, accessed 29 November 2023. (From Thatcher MSS, Churchill Archive Centre: THCR 1/9/18A/17 f12).
Margaret Thatcher, ‘Remarks Departing Downing Street’, 28 November 1990, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, < https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108258>, accessed 29 November 2023.
Margaret Thatcher, ‘Remarks on leadership election second ballot (“I shall fight on, I fight to win”)’, 21 November 1990, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, < https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108252>, accessed 29 November 2023.
Charles Powell, ‘European policy: No.10 record of conversation (MT, Kohl)’, 19 November 1990, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, < https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/215385>, accessed 29 November 2023. (From National Archives, Kew, PREM19/3314 f96).
Kenneth Baker, ‘Party Leadership contest: campaign strategy’, 14 November 1990, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, < https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/215554>, accessed 29 November 2023. (From Thatcher MSS, Churchill Archive Centre: THCR 2/6/4/55 f3).
Peter Morrison, ‘Lines to take’, 19 November 1990, < https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/215549>, accessed 29 November 2023. (From Thatcher MSS, Churchill Archive Centre: THCR 2/6/4/56 f162).
‘Interview for Dundee Courier’, 11-12 September 1989, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, < https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107755>, accessed 29 November 2023.
‘Interview for Sunday Telegraph’, 23 March 1990, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107901>, accessed 29 November 2023.
‘TV Interview for BBC (“Yes, I hope to go on and on”)’, 11 May 1987, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106615>, accessed 29 November 2023.
Margaret Thatcher, ‘Speech to Variety Clubs Dinner’, 13 September 1990, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108190>, accessed 29 November 2023.
‘Margaret Thatcher, ‘Speech at Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 12 November 1990, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108241>, accessed 7 December 2023.
Margaret Thatcher, ‘Speech to the College of Europe (“The Bruges Speech”)’, 20 September 1988, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332>, accessed 7 December 2023.
TV Interview for BBC (“I like Mr Gorbachev. We can do business together”)’, 17 December 1984, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105592 >, accessed 7 December 2023.

Hansard

‘Personal Statement’, HC Deb 13 November 1990, vol 180, cc461-5, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1990/nov/13/personal-statement>, accessed 29 November 2023.
‘European Council (Rome)’, HC Deb 30 October 1990, vol 178, cc873, <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1990-10-30/debates/c6856a57-2a92-40de-8fab-d7c941ede088/EuropeanCouncil(Rome)>, accessed 29 November 2023.
‘Confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’, HC Deb 22 November 1990 vol 181 c451, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1990/nov/22/confidence-in-her-majestys-government#column_451, accessed 29 November 2023.

Published and Audiovisual Refernces

Alan Clark, The Alan Clark Diaries: Thatcher’s Fall, (London, 1993).

Michael Heseltine, Life in the Jungle: My Autobiography, (London, 2000).

John Major, The Autobiography, (London, 1999).

Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: Volume 3, Herself Alone (London, 2019).

‘MT’s private files for 1989 – (3) Nigel Lawson’s resignation’, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/1989CAC3>, accessed 30 November 2023.

‘MT’s private files for 1990 – (7) uneasy peace then leadership election’, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/1990CAC7>, accessed 30 November 2023.

Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, (London, 1993).

‘The Fall of the Berlin Wall’, Miller Center, <https://millercenter.org/statecraftmovie/berlin-wall>, accessed 29 November 2023.

‘Wielding the Knife’, Thatcher: The Downing Street Years, written by Denys Blakeway, Season 1 Episode 4, Fine Art, 1993.

‘Chapter One’, House of Cards, directed by Paul Seed, written by Andrew Davies, Michael Dobbs, Season 1 Episode 1, BBC, 1990.

The Fall of Margaret Thatcher

Margaret Thatcher