The man who lost America – part 2

In part one, we looked at North’s response to the growing trouble in North America after the Boston Tea Party, which culminated in the January 1775 Cabinet decision to ‘entreat his Majesty to take the most effectual methods to enforce due obedience to the laws and authority of the supreme legislature of Great Britain.”^[0] In other words, to endorse the use of force to quell the troubles in America.

This second part looks at Lord North’s response to the crisis over the years that followed, as the American colonies slipped from his grasp entirely.

Read part 1 here

^[0] Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth, pp. 372-3.

A former Prime Minister intervenes

At a debate on the Boston Ports Act the 20 January 1775, in the House of Lords, no less a person than William Pitt the Elder, Lord Chatham stood to speak on the American crisis. Chatham had been Prime Minister during the 1760s and was the guiding force behind the 1757-62 Newcastle-Pitt government that had won the Seven Years’ War. To Georgian England, William Pitt was a patriotic hero, and one of the few Eighteenth Century politicians to have genuine popularity, even if it had been somewhat tarnished by his decision to accept a peerage, becoming the Earl of Chatham or Lord Chatham, in 1766.

Chatham was also a hero in the American colonies. During the Seven Years’ War, it had been his intervention that had made the North American theatre the top priority, and he insisted that the money be provided to pay for colonial forces. During the 1760s, he had defended the rights of the colonies against taxation.^[1] His popularity endured, with many places, streets, and towns named after him across the Thirteen Colonies (including the city of Pittsburgh).

By in January 1775, Chatham was elderly, and when he stood in the Lords he might well have worn bandages from persistent and painful gout. Yet, he was still capable of the sort of passionate oration with which he’d made his name decades before.

“This resistance to your arbitrary system of taxation might have been foreseen: it was obvious from the nature of things, and of mankind; and above all, from the Whiggish spirit flourishing in that country. The spirit which now resists your taxation in America, is the … same spirit which established the great fundamental, essential maxim of your liberties –  that no subject of England shall be taxed but by his own consent…I trust it is obvious to your lordships, that all attempts to impose servitude upon such men, to establish despotism over such a might continental nation, must be vain, must be fatal…undo these violent oppressive acts: they must be repealed’. ^[2]

Chatham’s young son wrote to his mother the following day to say that:

‘Nothing prevented his speech from being the most forcible that can be imagined, and administration fully felt it…The Ministry were violent beyond expectation, almost to madness. Instead of recalling the troops now there, they talked of sending more.’

Just over eight years later, that son would become Prime Minister himself – William Pitt the Younger.^[3]

Chatham returned to the House of Lords on the 2 February with a conciliatory plan. He proposed to end the trouble by withdrawing the troops from Boston, repealing the Coercive Acts, and suspending the punitive measures. He went far further than many opposition figures, even suggesting that ‘the general congress’ meeting in Philadelphia could be ‘organised and empowered to adjust and fix the proportions of the general contribution’. He said that the Colonies should have the right to internal taxes and raise their own revenue. Britain, he argued, should preserve imperial unity, creating a sort of federal system.

On the matter of Colonial taxation, Chatham proposed ‘no Tallage, Tax, or other Charge for His Majesty’s Revenue, shall be commanded or levied from British Freemen in America, without Common Consent, by act of Provincial Assembly there, duly convened for that Purpose’. Colonial self-taxation would be recognised as a constitutional right:‘America shall be restrained within their ancient limits’.^[4]

North’s ministers considered Chatham’s plan, but chose to reject it.^[5] The Lords ultimately rejected the plan by 61 to 32 on 1 February 1775.^[6] Benjamin Franklin, the American writer and polymath, watched from the galleries:

‘To hear so many of the Hereditary Legislators declaiming so vehemently against, not Adopting merely, but even the Consideration of a Proposal so important in its Nature, offered by a Person of so weighty a Character … gave me an exceeding mean Opinion of their Abilities, and made their Claim of Sovereignty over three Millions of virtuous sensible People in America, seem the greatest of Absurdities, since they appear’d to have scarce Discretion enough to govern a Herd of Swine.’ ^[7]

By contrast, George III wrote in a letter to Lord North of his:

‘infinite satisfaction…Nothing can be more calculated to bring the Americans to a due submission than the very handsome majority that at the outset have appeared in both Houses of Parliament.’ ^[8]

^[1] St Germain, ‘William Pitt’s Stamp Act Speech’, AmericanRevolution.org.
^[2] Parliamentary History of England, Vol. XVIII, Ref. 154-156.
^[3] William Stanhope Taylor & Captain John Henry Pringle (eds.), Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Volume IV, p. 376-77.
^[4] Parliamentary History of England, Vol. XVIII, Ref. 150-168.
^[5] Lucas, Lord North, Vol. II, p. 30-31^[6] Parliamentary History of England, Vol. XVIII, Ref. 198-204
^[7] ‘Benjamin Franklin to William Franklin: Journal of Negotiations in London, 22 March 1775’, Founders Archives.
^[8] Bodham Donne (ed.), Correspondence of King George the Third with Lord North, pp. 224-225.

By April 1775, the ‘Patriot’ militias in America had been arming and preparing their forces for months. In September and February, the Patriots had mobilised in response to British army efforts to seize military supplies around Boston. In December 1774, Patriots had seized gunpowder and cannons from Fort William and Mary in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Many began to expect that a clash was coming.

Intelligence received by the Colonial Secretary reflected on the impact of the Humble Address.

“the King’s [February] speech was received with a kind of sullenness, which I can hardly describe, but is strongly expressive of a resolution and spirit not to submit without a struggle, in case no conciliatory measures are adopted by Great Britain. There is scarcely a man in this country, my Lord, in or out of office, not of immediate appointment from England, who does not oppose taxation by the British Parliament… this country will be deluged with blood before it will submit to any other taxation than by their own Assemblies” ^[21]

In Britain, many feared that violence was just around the corner:

‘By the last Accounts from America, there is too much Reason to fear we shall hear of some bloody Action by the next. The Ministry themselves with the utmost Unconcern, say they expect it. But should so fatal an Event happen, an Event that would, in all Probability, tear the whole American Continent for ever from the British Crown…’ Hibernian Journal or Chronicle of Liberty, 8 May 1775 ^[22]

In contrast, some in London spoiled for a fight. In February 1775, First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Sandwich had dismissed the abilities of the Colonial forces as ‘raw, undisciplined, cowardly men.’ ^[23] A few months later, he reassured the House of Lords:

‘the Americans dared not and would not fight; that if they should, the sooner the better, as their defeat would be more inevitable and complete; and when they had once rise in arms, what was most devoutly to be wished was, that they should assemble in one, two, or three very numerous bodies, as by that means they might be more easily and decisively defeated.’ ^[24]

Be careful what you wish for…

^[21] Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth, p. 373.
^[22] Hibernian Journal or Chronicle of Liberty, 8 May 1775, British Newspaper Archives.
^[23] Ray Tyler, ‘245^th Anniversary of Lexington and Concord’, Teaching American History.
^[24] Leeds Intelligencer, 27 June 1775, British Newspaper Archive.

Shots heard around the world

By spring 1775, the crisis had reached breaking point.

On the evening of 18 April 1775, the British army under the command of General Gage marched out of Boston. Their mission was to seize military stores that were being collected in a place called Concord, some 20 miles away. With Massachusetts essentially in rebellion, and militias drilling, the British had decided it was time to forestall military preparations. “The Regulars are coming out”, cried Patriot horse riders as they spread the news.

Thus warned, at Lexington Green on the morning of 19 April, Patriot militia stood and confronted the British soldiers. A shot was fired, though who pulled the trigger will never be known. In reply, the redcoats riddled the militia with shot.

But, more militia began to converge, and the British troops were forced back to Boston, harassed by gunfire the whole way, and losing many casualties. This incident would be immortalised in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s poem as ‘The shot heard around the world’ and it marked the beginning of the American War of Independence. The colonial militias laid siege to Boston, with the intention of expelling the British forces.

The news of the fighting sent shockwaves across North America. Many previously undecided threw in their lot with the rebellion

‘in [New York] it is astonishing to find the most violent proposals meeting with universal approbation – the whole city is arming and removing the cannon to a strong place…’, wrote one witness.^[25]

Patriots seized British arms in Charleston, South Carolina and Williamsburg, Virginia.

Intelligence dated August 1775 and received by one Lord Dartmouth said that:

‘The contagion spreads, and, as in  the first instances, the quarrel. begins with the Governor and ends with the Crown. This republican spirit has in America the same effect as bigotry in religion had once in Europe. The House of Representatives is more than one half republicans, and the majority of Council have other measures which will be subservient to that cause.’ ^[26]

On 17 June 1775, British forces crossed the Charles River to secure the Charlestown peninsula opposite Boston and destroy militia positions on Breeds Hill. Twice the redcoats advanced against the Americans, only to be repulsed in bloody shambles. Finally, a third attack conquered the hill, and only then because the Americans ran out of ammunition. Over two hundred redcoats lay dead and nearly a thousand had been wounded. Gage’s command had been devastated because almost a hundred senior officers had been killed or wounded. One British general wrote that it was a “dear bought victory, another such would have ruined us.”^[27] ‘Bunker Hill’, as the battle became known, demonstrated that the Americans were not the ‘raw, undisciplined, cowardly men’ of Sandwich’s imagination, but an organised and disciplined opponent that would fight very bravely.

What had started as political protest against Parliamentary taxation was now an armed rebellion. The fact was not lost on Lord North. Reflecting on the fighting, he privately told one supporter that he did not think America could be reconquered.^[28]

^[25] Chester Chronicle, 19 June 1775, British Newspaper Archives.
^[26] Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth, p. 384.
^[27] Ferling, Almost a Miracle, p. 59-60.
^[28] O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America, p. 58.

On October 1775, Lord North had outlined the government’s strategy for the new year in a letter to Lord Grafton:

‘… the leaders of the rebellion in the Colonies plainly declare themselves not satisfied with those conditions and manifestly aim at total Independence. Against this we propose to exert ourselves using every species of force to reduce them; but authorising at the same time either the Commander-in-Chief, or some other Commissioner, to proclaim immediately peace and pardon, and to restore all the privileges of trade to any colony upon its submission.’ ^[41]

A large army was sent to America, along with a large fleet. The force would be commanded by brothers, General William Howe in charge of the army, and Admiral Richard Howe in charge of the navy. In keeping with the dual strategy of force and conciliation, the two were officially peace commissioners, ordered to defeat the Americans and then empowered to make peace. Nevertheless, their authority was limited, any accommodation was not to admit the right of taxation: ‘taxation was not to be given up’, North told Parliament on 22 May 1776.^[42]

Lord North and Lord Germain hoped that the Howe brothers could inflict a decisive defeat on the American rebels, establishing a secure base in major city, and reasserting Crown authority. This would, in turn, inspire the Loyalists and allow Royal government to be restored over large swathes of America. With the American cause dealt such a blow, they would have to accept Britain’s terms, with the Howes on the spot to rapidly lay down peace terms.

^[41] Quoted in Lucas, Lord North, Vol. II, p.35.
^[42] Lucas, Lord North, Vol. II, p.48.

Declaration of Independence

By the end of 1775, with no sign of substantial concessions from London, the Americans began to ask whether a permanent separation was the only solution. In his famous pamphlet Common Sense, Thomas Paine argued that the Americans needed to set a grander objective than simply changing policy in Westminster.

‘The object contended for, ought always to bear some just proportion to the expense. The removal of North, or the whole detestable junto, is a matter unworthy to the millions we have expended… As I have always considered the independency of this continent, as an event, which sooner or later must arrive, so from the late rapid progress of the continent to maturity, the event could not be far off.’ ^[43]

As the months passed, sympathy for the cause of independence rose.

On 4 July 1776, the Second Continental Congress, meeting in Philadelphia unanimously adopted a Declaration of Independence:

“…these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved…”  ^[44]

^[43] Thomas Paine, ‘Common Sense’, p. 28.
^[44] ‘Declaration of Independence: A Transcription’, 4 July 1776.

Long Island and New York, 1776

General William Howe’s New York campaign was the biggest British combined naval and amphibious operation to that date, with over 30,000 soldiers landing. In August 1776, the British army defeated the Continental Army at Long Island, before crossing the East River and seizing New York. British casualties had been light, and wherever the Americans fought, the British regulars had defeated them. These victories seemed to vindicate North and Germain’s strategy of subduing the Americans with force.

George III was delighted, writing to Lord North that ‘nothing can have been better planned, nor with moi’e alacrity executed, than the taking of the city of New York, and I trust the rebel army will soon be dispersed.’^[45] For the first time in the American crisis, the British had won a major offensive victory. Perhaps the Americans could be brought to heel.

For all the King’s optimism, the radical John Wilkes had a better strategic grasp of the situation. He observed that the Americans might well have been defeated, but that they had fought ‘…they acted as brave men …and attacked with spirit’. He argued that compared to the loss of Boston, which was ‘the capital of North America’ and had been abandoned by British forces in March, New York was a poorer prize: ‘Is that great and important town advantageously exchanged for New York? I forgot that we still possess the fishing hamlet of Halifax…’.^[46] Militarily the British were winning, but the Continental Army was still intact, the hoped-for victory had not been the knockout blow envisioned.

On 11 September 1776, British Admiral Howe met John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and Edward Rutledge on Staten Island, with the hope that they could resolve the conflict peacefully. However, the Americans demanded that Howe recognise their independence, which he would and could not do, and the conference was a failure.^[47]  With that, the only meeting between representatives of the two governments before 1782 failed.

Ironically, at what proved to be the height of Britain’s military fortunes, the Declaration of Independence had proved that politically and strategically the war had already slipped out of the ministry’s grasp.

^[45] Bodham Donne (ed.), Correspondence of King George the Third with Lord North, Volume II, p.39.
^[46] Parliamentary History of England, Vol. XVIII, Ref. 1403-04.
^[47] O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America, P. 99

Personal doubts

As the war continued and intensified, Lord North found himself feeling somewhat overwhelmed. Horace Walpole wrote that ‘Lord North had neither devised the war nor liked it, but liked his place, whatever he pretended’.^[48]

In August 1777, North asked King George III if he could be replaced as Prime Minister. He told him that he disliked being Prime Minister.^[49] But, more than simple political expedience held North to George III. The premiership had proven lucrative for North, and his wife held the sinecure of the Rangership of Bushy Park. The King also paid off North’s debts in 1777. The lines between professional duty and personal loyalty were long blurred.^[50]

He attempted to resign again in 1778, even going so far as to sketch out a better model for how the war might be run:

‘The public business can never go on as it ought, while the Principal & most efficient offices are in the hands of persons who are either indifferent to, or actually dislike their situation… it is necessary there should be one directing Minister, who should plan the whole of the operations of government…Lord North conceives these two rules to be wise & true, & therefore, thinks it his duty to submit the expediency of his Majesty’s removing him as soon as he can… he can never like a situation which he has most perfectly disliked even in much better and easier times.’ ^[51]

But, once again, the King refused North’s request.

^[48] Lucas, Lord North, Vol. II, p.2
^[49] Lucas, Lord North, Vol. II, p. 28 & p. 52.
^[50] O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America, p. 48
^[51] Williams (ed.), Eighteenth Century Constitution, p. 132